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The Global Crisis and Intergovernmental Relations: Revisiting the
Centralisation-Decentralisation Debate Ten Years On

Luiz de Mello and João Tovar Jalles1

January 2018
Abstract

There is a growing empirical literature on the effects of the global financial and economic crisis on
intergovernmental relations. This paper contributes to this literature by focusing on conventional
budgetary aggregates and institutional indicators of subnational authority in policymaking and fiscalfinancial management. The empirical analysis is carried out for a large set of advanced and emergingmarket/developing economies between 1990 and 2015 and shows that the crisis has been associated
with an increase in the subnational shares of general government spending and revenue. The findings
for subnational authority over policy and fiscal-financial management are more nuanced and suggest
that increases in government indebtedness (spending) since the crisis have been associated with
greater (weaker) subnational authority. It is possible that the need to deliver debt reductions through
medium-term fiscal consolidation calls for greater intergovernmental coordination, which enhances
the bargaining power of the subnational jurisdictions to broaden their prerogatives in fiscal matters
and influence national policymaking.

1 Luiz de Mello is Director at the Economics Department of the OECD, and João Tovar Jalles is a
Research Economist at the Research Department of the IMF.

Paper prepared for presentation at the Third International Conference on “Decentralisation after the
Great Recession: Fine-Tuning or Paradigm Change?”, Santiago de Compostela, 26-27 October 2017
organized by GEN (University of Vigo). This conference was financially supported by the Spanish
Ministry of Science and Innovation (CSO2013-40723-C2-1-R and CSO2013-40723-C2-2-R), AIReF
(Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility), the University of Vigo and ECOBAS. The authors are
indebted to Oriol Roca, Andreas Kyriacou, Pablo Beramendi, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Santiago
Lago-Peñas for their valuable comments and suggestions. We remain solely responsible for any
remaining errors and/or omissions. The views expressed in this paper are the authors’ own and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Organisations to which they are affiliated and their member countries.
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1. Introduction

The global financial and economic crisis had a marked impact on the public finances, especially in the
advanced economies. Public debt levels rose sharply as a result of the implementation of countercyclical stimulus packages, extra-budgetary and below-the-line operations, such as equity injections
and troubled asset purchases, as well as the cyclical effects of the contraction in economic activity in
the aftermath of the crisis. Indeed, at around 107 percent of GDP in 2016, total public debt ratios are
on average still close to 30 percentage points higher than before the crisis among OECD countries. This
ratio includes the combined debt of regional and local governments, which almost doubled in relation
to GDP to about 10 percent on average over the same period. The emerging-market economies and
developing countries fared somewhat better, especially those that took the high-growth years in the
run-up to the crisis to reduce vulnerabilities to capital flow reversals through sound macroeconomic
and structural reforms.

Importantly, the crisis also had a bearing on intergovernmental relations. In the immediate aftermath
of the crisis, counter-cyclical activism included large public investment programmes that were carried
out predominantly at the subnational level and financed by the centre through grants and transfers.
The post-crisis surge in subnational spending was subsequently reversed as activity began to recover,
stimulus was withdrawn, and fiscal consolidation programmes were put in place to restore the longerterm sustainability of the public finances. In addition to these budgetary effects, intergovernmental
relations were also impacted by the crisis in several countries as a result of wide-ranging institutional
reforms to fiscal-financial management. In the European Union, for example, reforms enhanced the
engagement of the subnational governments in national medium-term fiscal consolidation
programmes, established binding public debt and/or deficit ceilings applying to both the central
government and the subnational jurisdictions, and in some cases introduced restrictions on
subnational borrowing.2

Another goal of post-crisis reforms has been to improve the managerial efficiency of the subnational
governments to ensure the delivery of cost-effective services to the population at the time of fiscal

2

For analyses of the fiscal impacts of the global financial and economic crisis on subnational governments, see
for example, Ter-Minassian and Fedelino (2009) and OECD (2009a, 2009b).
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duress. Reforms included in some cases the consolidation of subnational jurisdictions in recognition of
the potential for economies of scale in the delivery of services. Europe offers numerous examples, such
the reorganisation of regional governments in Finland, France and Greece. Of course, these reforms
were not triggered by the crisis, and in some cases were already under way at the onset of the crisis,
but they were in different ways shaped by the need for greater efficiency in intergovernmental fiscal
relations against the imperatives of medium-term fiscal consolidation and the challenges posed by
secular trends, especially those related to population ageing, which are putting upward pressure on
government budgets.

An additional, somewhat overlooked, legacy of the crisis has been a change in the ability of subnational
governments to influence national policymaking. In some cases, the need to engage the regional and
local governments in nationwide fiscal consolidation programmes -- and to secure their political
support for reform -- has actually empowered the subnational jurisdictions in the policy arena, given
them a stronger voice in intergovernmental policy fora. In other words, the opportunity posed by the
needed post-crisis policy reform enhanced the bargaining power of the subnational governments in
national policymaking. In some cases, subnational governments used this enhanced bargaining power
to enhance their autonomy in policymaking and fiscal-financial matters.

Against this background, the objective of this paper is to revisit the empirical evidence of the effects
of the crisis on intergovernmental fiscal relations. Two broad classes of indicators will be used,
including first a range of metrics for the composition of expenditure, including those financed by
intergovernmental grants and transfers, as well as revenue across the different levels of
administration. These indicators based on budgetary aggregates are conventional gauges of fiscal
decentralisation and proxy for the otherwise unmeasured assignment of expenditure and revenue
functions across the different layers of government. To complement the fiscal decentralisation metrics,
a second batch of indicators will be used to describe the institutional underpinnings of
intergovernmental relations, including the prerogatives granted to the subnational governments in
policymaking and fiscal-financial management. Measures of subnational influence in national policy,
including in fiscal-financial management, will also be considered.

As recognised frequently in the empirical literature, the fiscal decentralisation indicators reflect only
imperfectly the autonomy enjoyed by subnational governments in policymaking. They need to be
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complemented by other indicators that reflect the formal authority of subnational governments in
matters related to policy and management. While the fiscal decentralisation indicators are available
for relatively long time series for large sets of countries from sources such as the IMF’s Government
Financial Statistics, the OECD’s Regional Dataset, the Eurostat and other organisations, there is a
relative dearth of quantitative indicators of authority that cover a broad range of policy and managerial
aspects of intergovernmental relations and exhibit sufficient time series variation to be used
meaningfully in empirical analysis. A data set that meets these criteria is that of Hooghe et al. (2010,
2016), which covers a variety of advanced and emerging-market economies, as well as developing
countries, over a long time span of several decades.

The key hypothesis to be tested is whether or not the crisis has been a trigger or catalyst for reform in
intergovernmental relations. The empirical analysis will be based on panel regressions of the full
spectrum of decentralisation indicators described above on a range of decentralisation drivers, while
controlling for country and time effects. The effects of the crisis will be assessed essentially by
interacting the right hand-side variables of interest with an indicator that identifies the post-crisis
years. Comparison of the pre- and post-crisis parameter estimates for the variables of interest will shed
light on the mechanisms through which the crisis has affected intergovernmental relations in the
countries included in the panels.

The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, the crisis seems to have had a
decentralising effect on the public finances, at least as far as measured by conventional budgetary
aggregates. In other words, increases in general government spending and debt ratios have been
associated with higher subnational shares in spending and revenue collection since the crisis. To a large
extent, this effect is shaped by the role of subnational governments in the execution of stimulus
programmes that were implemented in the immediate aftermath of the crisis and financed by the
centre in the form of intergovernmental grants and transfers, as noted above. Subnational
governments already account for about 60 percent of general government investment on average
world-wide according to the OECD, and they accounted for the bulk of the public works programmes
that were put in place in the aftermath of the crisis.

Second, more nuanced findings emerge from the analysis of the effects of the crisis on the institutional
indicators of subnational authority in policymaking and fiscal-financial management. While increases
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in general government spending after the crisis appear to have reduced subnational authority across
a range of self- and shared-rule prerogatives, the converse is true for increases in general government
indebtedness. The exact mechanisms through which these effects take place have yet to be assessed
empirically, but it can be argued that the need to deliver debt reduction through medium-term fiscal
consolidation requires a concerted effort among the different spheres of government. In some cases,
better intergovernmental policy coordination has been pursued to muster support for adjustment. In
others, and depending on specific conditions and context, the subnational governments may have
strengthened their bargaining power to negotiate amongst themselves and with the central
government greater authority in matters for which they have sole responsibility, as well as their ability
to influence national policymaking.

Motivation for the analysis reported in this paper comes from different sources. First, the crisis has
rekindled interest in comparative federalism and the economic effects of a protracted period of
economic and fiscal duress on reform of intergovernmental fiscal relations around the world. Case
studies have been used to describe the institutional changes that have been brought about by the
crisis, although in many cases the crisis can be argued to have catalysed reforms that had already been
in course (Kincaid et al. 2010; Eccleston and Trevor, 2017). Second, and in part as a result of this
renewed interest, the efforts that have been put over the years to develop indicators and collect data
on different aspects of intergovernmental relations now allow for a much finer analysis of the causes
and consequences of institutional reform from a cross-country perspective. Given the remaining
methodological limitations of this strand of empirical work, such the ability of the researcher to take
account of all the relevant cross-country heterogeneity of causal mechanisms, context and institutions,
as well as channels of transmission, the analysis can only complement the wealth of information that
can reported in country-specific case studies.

The remainder of paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the empirical analysis, the
estimating strategy, the range of decentralisation indicators used and the source of data. The baseline
results are reported in Section 3 for the three categories of indicators: fiscal decentralisation, authority
of subnational governments and composition of government expenditure across levels of
administration. Sensitivity analysis and robustness checks are also reported. A broader discussion of
the empirical results and conclusions is presented in Section 4.
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2. Empirical analysis

Estimating strategy: gauging the effects of the crisis

The effects of the crisis can be gauged by regressing the full range of indicators measuring different
aspects of intergovernmental relations on a set of variables capturing the key drivers of reform and
interactions of these variables with an indicator that takes the value of 0 for the pre-crisis years (before
2007) and 1, otherwise. In particular, the baseline regressions, estimated by OLS, can be defined as
follows:

𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 𝑋𝑖𝑡 (𝐼 + 𝜙𝑖𝑡 )+𝑎2 𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡

(1)

where D is an indicator capturing a given aspect of intergovernmental relations; X is a vector of relevant
drivers of reform in intergovernmental relations; R is a set of controls, including country and time
effects (the first are included to control for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity, while the second
are included to control for global shocks); 𝜙𝑖𝑡 is an indicator taking the value of 0 for the pre-crisis
country-years, and 1 otherwise; I is an identity vector; and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an error term satisfying usual
assumptions of zero mean and constant variance. Countries and years are identified by subscripts i and
t, respectively.

The aspects of intergovernmental relations (denoted by indicator D) are of three types:3

-

Composition of revenue and expenditure across the spheres of government. In this case, D is
a continuous variable defined either as the inverse of the ratio of the central government share
of expenditure over the share of general government expenditure (expenditure
decentralisation) or the ratio of local expenditures financed with local revenues (revenue

3

In the appendix we present for each data source the list of countries covered as well as summary statistics and
correlation matrices amongst the different variables used.
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decentralisation). Data are available from Sow and Razafimahefa (2017) and cover 64 OECD
and non-OECD countries over the period 1990 to 2012.4

-

Functional composition of government spending and revenue. These indicators are based on
the classification of the main budgetary aggregates from a functional viewpoint. They are
defined as the share of subnational (middle-tier and local) governments in total general
government spending and revenue by function. Emphasis is placed on total spending and
revenue, tax and social security revenue, as well as outlays on economic affairs, health care,
education and social protection. These revenue and spending functions account for the lion’s
share of subnational budgets in most countries. Data are available from the IMF’s Government
Finance Statistics database and include an updated version (up to 2015) of the work by Dziobek
et al. (2011), which covered about 80 countries over a period of close to 20 years (1990-2008).5

-

Subnational authority in policymaking and fiscal-financial management. These indicators are
related to changes in the assignment of policymaking authority and responsibilities across the
different levels of administration, the executive and law-making prerogatives of the
subnational governments, as well as inter-jurisdictional coordination mechanisms. Data are
available from Hooghe et al. (2016) and cover 81 countries over the period 1950-2010.
The key indicators measure two broad aspects of subnational authority: self- and shared rule.
The self-rule indicators are based on the policy, fiscal-financial and representation autonomy
of the subnational governments within their own jurisdictional borders. They include the
institutional autonomy (depth) of regional governments (measured on a 0-3 scale with
increasing level of authority), their policy scope (or range of policies under regional
government authority, measured on a 0-4 scale with increasing breadth of policy areas,
including economic affairs, education and welfare, etc.), their fiscal autonomy (measured on a
0-4 scale of increasing regional autonomy to set tax bases and rates), and their borrowing
autonomy (measured on a 0-3 scale of decreasing central government control over
subnational borrowing), and their representation independence (measure on a 0-4 scale

4

Data were collected mostly from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics and World Economic Outlook
databases, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, as well as Eurostat and OECD databases.
5

We thank the authors for kindly sharing their data.
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identifying the existence of an independent executive branch and a legislature at the
subnational level).

The shared-rule indicators measure the extent of joint prerogatives of subnational
governments based on their capacity to influence national legislation and policy. They include
the ability of the subnational governments to influence national legislation (law-making,
measured on a 0-2 scale of increasing level of law-making co-determination between
subnational and national governments) and co-set national policy in intergovernmental fora
(executive control, measured on a 0-2 scale of increasing ability), the distribution of national
tax revenue (fiscal control, measured on a 0-2 scale of increasing ability), subnational and
national borrowing constraints (borrowing control, measured on a 0-2 scale of increasing
ability), and constitutional change (constitution reform, measured on a 0-4 scale of increasing
ability). These individual indicators are also used to construct composite indicators of self and
shared rule, as well as an aggregate Regional Authority Index.

Of course, while the fiscal decentralisation indicators provide useful information on the budgetary
resources that are available to the subnational governments, their spending commitments and
financial obligations, they do not necessarily reflect the policymaking or managerial authority enjoyed
by the subnational jurisdictions. This authority goes beyond matters related to the public finances –
tax and spending powers as well as financial management – and includes the fiscal, financial, policy,
representational and constitutional arrangements at the subnational level, such as the structure of
their executive and legislative branches; the range of shared responsibilities among the different
spheres of government and administration; and the ability of the subnational governments to
influence national policy.

While alternative indicators are available to measure subnational autonomy in tax policy, essentially
by weighing tax revenue ratios by some measure of subnational tax policy autonomy (Stegarescu,
2005; Blöchliger and King, 2006), a broader gauge of subnational authority, such as those available
from Hooghe et al. (2016) is particularly useful in the empirical assessment of the effects of the crisis,
given the breadth of effects associated with policy responses and accompanying institutional reform.
Indeed, a precursor to these more recent measurement efforts is Kearney (1999), whose
decentralisation index include several aspects of subnational autonomy, such as government
structure, executive selection and central veto power, in additional to revenue and spending authority.
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Another advantage of the subnational authority indicators used in our empirical analysis is their time
series and cross-sectional coverage and variation, which is far greater than that of indicators based on
constitutional parameters, such as that of Elazar (1987). The indicators therefore allow for a finer
analysis of incremental institutional change, rather than radical constitutional reforms. Indeed, a lack
of time series variability in the indicators has posed serious obstacles to sound empirical analyses on
the drivers and effects of decentralisation, which explains the emphasis that has been put in the
literature on fiscal indicators based on higher-frequency budgetary data.6

All in all, these indicators describe longer-term trends that were in motion before the crisis. For
example, both the fiscal decentralisation and subnational authority indicators point to a gradual
process of decentralisation around the world, regardless of the countries’ level of economic
development. Decentralisation started earlier in most advanced economies and gathered momentum
in Latin America in the 1980s, chiefly as a result of democratisation, and later in the Asia-Pacific region.
Major democratic transitions have indeed been key drivers of decentralisation.7 The literature on
comparative federalism based on constitutional provisions also documents a trend towards greater
decentralisation over the years leading up to the crisis (OECD and KIPF, 2016). There is indeed a shift
to the right in the distributions of two selected fiscal Decentralisation indicators (one for expenditures
and one for revenues) between 1990 and 2012, suggesting increased Decentralisation (Figure 1).

6

The coverage of both indicators differs in that the Hooghe et al. (2016) indicators exclude local governments,
or jurisdictions with less than 150 thousand inhabitants, whereas the fiscal decentralisation indicators include
both middle-tier and local governments.
7

See for example the analysis reported by Jametti and Joanis (2009) based on the IMF’s Government Finance
Statistics database, OECD and KIPF (2016) based on OECD data.
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Figure 1. Kernel Densities of selected Fiscal Decentralisation Indicators
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Source: Authors’ estimations.

The right hand-side variables of interest in our empirical analysis are the conventional determinants of
decentralisation, such as the country’s stage of economic development (measured by the level of real
per capita GDP), the level of total public debt and expenditure (both defined in relation to GDP), as
well as a host of control variables, including proxies for macroeconomic imbalances (the rate of CPI
inflation, the rate of growth of real GDP and the rate of unemployment), external imbalances (the
terms of trade and trade openness, defined as the ratio of imports plus exports over GDP), and a
measure of long-term expenditure pressures (the age dependency ratio).

Moreover, we control for broader institutional characteristics by including in the regressions two
variables from the Database of Political Institutions (which cover 180 countries between 1975 and
2015): stability, and checks and balances. These indicators proxy for the presence of well-functioning
institutions and their quality, over and above those related to intergovernmental relations. More
specifically, “checks and balances” measure the number of veto players in a political system, adjusting
for whether or not these veto players are independent of each other, as determined by the level of
electoral competitiveness in a system, their respective party affiliations and the electoral rules (the
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original variable is constructed on a 0-18 scale in ascending order of strength of check and balances).8
The “stability” indicator measures the percentage of veto players who drop from the government in
any given year.9

3. Baseline results

Fiscal decentralisation indicators: a focus on the public finances

The baseline results are reported in Table 1 for the fiscal decentralisation indicators, which capture the
composition of expenditure, revenue and intergovernmental transfers among the different levels of
administration. The indicators are constructed in ascending order, such that an increase in the
indicator denotes a rise in the subnational shares of expenditure and revenue. All regressions are
estimated by OLS and include both country and time fixed effects.

The parameter estimates show that higher-spending countries tend to be less decentralised, a feature
of the public finances that has been mitigated at least in part by the crisis. The finding applies to all
three decentralisation indicators: expenditure, revenue and intergovernmental transfers. In addition,
more indebted countries also tend to be less decentralised, at least as far as the expenditure
decentralisation indicator is concerned, a finding that does not seem to have been affected by the
crisis.

The controls are signed as follows: macroeconomic imbalances are associated with less
decentralisation (inflation and unemployment), economic development matters (richer countries are

8

Countries where legislatures are not competitively elected are considered countries where only the executive
wields a check.

9

Readers should refer to the codebook available at https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/7408 for
further details.
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less decentralised),10 and countries that are more open to trade also tend to be less decentralised,11
as well as those with a higher age dependency ratio and better institutions. The baseline results are
also robust to the omission of time effects and alternative combinations of the set of control variables.

Table 1. Baseline Results: Fiscal Decentralisation Indicators
Specifications
Dependent Variables

Inflation rate

Real GDP growth

Real GDP per capita

Total Expenditures

Public Debt

Inflation rate*postgfc

Real GDP
growth*postgfc

Real GDP per
capita*postgfc

Total
Expenditures*postgfc

Public Debt*postgfc

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Subnational
share of
spending

Subnational
share of revenue

Subnational
share of
transfers

Subnational
share of
spending

Subnational
share of revenue

Subnational
share of
transfers

-0.220***

-0.149***

-0.094**

-0.208***

-0.137**

-0.088**

(0.073)

(0.054)

(0.040)

(0.074)

(0.054)

(0.038)

0.009

-0.010

-0.059

0.023

0.005

-0.040

(0.092)

(0.053)

(0.061)

(0.092)

(0.052)

(0.059)

-0.138***

-0.128***

-0.136***

-0.131***

-0.121***

-0.126***

(0.027)

(0.021)

(0.025)

(0.028)

(0.022)

(0.025)

-0.288***

-0.153***

-0.158***

-0.277***

-0.139***

-0.144***

(0.070)

(0.051)

(0.052)

(0.071)

(0.051)

(0.052)

-0.040*

0.005

0.016

-0.042*

0.002

0.013

(0.021)

(0.012)

(0.012)

(0.021)

(0.012)

(0.012)

0.239***

0.160**

0.125*

0.229***

0.152**

0.121*

(0.082)

(0.063)

(0.070)

(0.083)

(0.063)

(0.070)

-0.161

-0.041

-0.084

-0.182

-0.057

-0.098

(0.128)

(0.087)

(0.089)

(0.127)

(0.083)

(0.087)

-0.002

-0.001

-0.002

-0.002

-0.001

-0.002

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.254***

0.113***

0.073***

0.253***

0.112***

0.072***

(0.080)

(0.035)

(0.026)

(0.081)

(0.035)

(0.026)

-0.026

-0.009

0.011

-0.025

-0.009

0.012
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Recent evidence on the links between economic development and decentralisation include Panizza (1999)
and Arzaghi and Henderson (2005). Both studies focus on expenditure centralisation and find that income (as
well as land area) is negatively associated with centralisation.

11

Stegarescu (2009) uses OECD data to assess the effect of economic and political integration on
decentralisation and finds that trade openness is associated with a higher degree of decentralisation.
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Trade openness

Unemployment rate

Age dependency ratio

Checks and balances

(0.017)

(0.011)

(0.007)

(0.017)

(0.010)

(0.007)

-0.000**

-0.000**

-0.000

-0.000**

-0.000**

-0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.002***

-0.001**

-0.002*

-0.002***

-0.001*

-0.001

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.002***

-0.002***

-0.003***

-0.002***

-0.002***

-0.003***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.002

-0.001

-0.002**

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)
-0.010*

-0.006

-0.002

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.004)

Stability

Constant

-0.644**

-0.703***

-0.831***

-0.585**

-0.643***

-0.759***

(0.260)

(0.209)

(0.233)

(0.267)

(0.213)

(0.237)

898

928

972

901

933

977

0.949

0.975

0.977

0.950

0.975

0.977

Observations
R-squared
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Note: Estimation of Equation (1) by OLS. Time and country fixed effects included but omitted for reasons of parsimony. Robust
standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1
percent levels, respectively.

Source: Authors’ estimations.

The baseline findings are not surprising. The large stimulus packages that were put in place in the
aftermath of the crisis, especially in the advanced economies, were carried out to a large extent by the
subnational governments and financed predominantly through central government grants and
transfers.12 This has led to an increase in both the subnational spending and revenue shares in the
aftermath of the crisis, a trend that was subsequently reversed as the stimulus packages were
withdrawn and central government grants and transfers were pared back. In this respect, the effects
of the crisis on the subnational budgets reflect the role that the subnational governments played as
agents of the central government in the post-crisis stabilisation efforts. This is, of course, over and
above the direct effects of the crisis on the subnational finances, which took place through several
12

We experimented with adding the share of general government capital spending in GDP in the baseline
regressions. The results (available upon request) confirm the increase in the subnational share of transfers and
revenue after the crisis associated with the post-crisis investment drive. However, capital spending data are
available only for a significantly smaller sample of country-years; the indicator was therefore omitted from the
baseline specification.
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different channels, including a cyclical contraction in their own revenue base, a reduction in
compliance by liquidity-constrained taxpayers, increases in cyclically-sensitive spending (such as
unemployment benefits and social assistance transfers, which in many countries are executed at the
subnational level of government), and in some cases pressure to assist troubled state-owned or
controlled enterprises, as well as (potentially large) losses in financial investments.

To be sure about the econometric specification, we tested for residual autocorrelation using the
Wooldridge (2002) test and could not reject the null of no serial correlation in the residuals of the
baseline specifications (with a p-value in excess of 20 percent). We also experimented with a variety
of indicators of heterogeneity of the population, which is another driver of decentralisation that may
not be fully captured by the fixed effects, leading to omitted variable biases. We included the
language, ethnic and religious fragmentation measures available from Alesina et al. (2003) and found
them to be statistically significant at classical levels in the baseline regressions (results available upon
request), but these indicators are time-invariant and were therefore omitted from the baseline
specification. We also experimented with alternative indicators of institutional development, such as
the WGI governance indicators (rule of law, government effectiveness, and voice and accountability)
and the CPIA corruption indicator, but found them not to be robustly strong co-variates with the
subnational shares of spending and revenue in the baseline specifications (results available upon
request).

Subnational authority indicators: going beyond the public finances

As far as the subnational autonomy decentralisation indicators are concerned, the baseline results
based on the Hooghe et al. (2016) indicators are reported in Tables 2-4. As it was the case with the
fiscal decentralisation indicators, the subnational autonomy indicators are constructed in ascending
order, with an increase in the indicator denoting an increase in subnational autonomy. The regressions
are estimated by OLS and include both country and time fixed effects.

The parameter estimates show that the crisis has been associated with a reduction in subnational
autonomy in the higher-spending countries across the range of self-rule prerogatives covered by the
indicators, including in policy and fiscal-financial management, except for the endowment of
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representative institutions. The results are less clear-cut for the different components of the shared
rule indicators, although on the basis of the composite indicator, it seems that the ability of the
subnational governments to influence national policy and fiscal-financial management may have been
curtailed too. The composite indicators of self and shared rule, as well as the overall regional autonomy
indicator, also point towards a curtailment of subnational autonomy in the immediate aftermath of
the crisis.
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By contrast with the findings based on general government spending, the regressions show that an
increase in government indebtedness has been associated with greater self rule at the subnational
level since the crisis, especially as far as their policy, taxing and borrowing autonomy is concerned.
Interestingly, higher indebtedness has also been associated with an increase in subnational influence
in national law-making since the crisis. The composite indicator of self rule, but not that of shared rule,
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and the overall regional autonomy indicator also point to an increase in subnational autonomy in the
immediate aftermath of the crisis.

Some comments on the set of included controls are worthwhile. More specifically, macroeconomic
imbalances have a mixed effect on decentralisation, with an increase in inflation reducing subnational
self rule, but the converse is true for unemployment and economic growth. Self rule is also stronger in
more developed countries, or those with higher per capita GDP. A higher age dependency ratio and
greater trade openness tend to be associated with greater subnational ability to influence national
policy, or a higher degree of shared rule on the basis of the subnational autonomy indicators used in
the analysis.

All in all, and although the self- and shared-rule indicators only cover a short period of time in the
aftermath of the crisis, it seems that the increase in government indebtedness and spending that
occurred in several countries, due predominantly to a combination of cyclical developments and the
implementation of counter-cyclical stimulus packages, has had an impact on intergovernmental
relations and institutions. This impact appears to have curtailed certain aspects of subnational fiscalfinancial and policy self rule, and to some extent the ability of subnational governments to influence
national policymaking, at least where the crisis has been associated with an increase in government
spending. On the other hand, the increase in public indebtedness that also resulted from the crisis
appears to have had the opposite effect, enhancing subnational self-rule in policymaking and fiscalfinancial management.

The contrast between the findings for government spending and indebtedness is not surprising. First
of all, the increase in government spending that occurred in the years following the crisis reflected to
a large extent the implementation of stimulus packages executed by the subnational governments but
financed predominantly by the centre, at least in the advanced economies. This centre-led policy
response was reflected in several cases in a reduction in subnational policymaking and fiscal-financial
management autonomy, as well as the ability of the subnational governments to influence national
policy. By contrast, dealing with government indebtedness to address the needed post-crisis fiscal
consolidation requires a longer-term policy response that depends on cooperation with the
subnational governments, at least in those countries where fiscal policy is conducted in a decentralised
fashion. In many cases, the subnational governments have been called upon to participate in national
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fiscal consolidation plans, as was the case of the adjustment pacts that were put in place in several EU
countries, including Austria and Germany, where explicit targets have been agreed between the
central and subnational governments. Where intergovernmental cooperation has been strengthened,
the ability of the subnational governments to influence national policymaking may have been
enhanced, and an increase in subnational self-rule may have been a necessary quid pro quo.

These findings are related to the political economy literature pioneered by Besley and Coate (2003),
among others, which looks at policy outcomes in situations where regional politicians bargain over
fiscal policy at the national level. The extent to which policymaking is decentralised depends in this
case on several drivers, including shifts in the power balance within the country and uncertainty over
the ability of specific regions to reflect their interests in national policy choices. In the case of fiscal
consolidation in response to the crisis-induced rise in public indebtedness, there is uncertainty over
whether or not centralised policymaking would result in a balanced distribution of the costs of
adjustment across regions, as well as between the regions and the centre. This uncertainty creates an
incentive for the regions to collude among themselves and bid for greater policymaking and managerial
authority, resulting in a more decentralised governance arrangement. Further empirical work is
nevertheless warranted to test this hypothesis.

Drilling down on the public finances: What programmatic areas matter the most?

A third category of decentralisation indicators used in our empirical analysis focuses on the functional
composition of spending and revenue across the different layers of administration. As in the case of
the decentralisation indicators based on budgetary aggregates, emphasis is still placed on the public
finances as a source of quantitative information, but a finer look at the evolving subnational shares
across a variety of functional areas provides complementary evidence on decentralisation trends and
the effects of the crisis on intergovernmental fiscal relations. An obvious limitation of the analysis is
that the assignment of spending and revenue functions across the spheres of government is hardly
ever clear-cut, which results in overlapping mandates.

The regression results reported in Tables 5-6 include both country and time fixed effects for ease of
comparison with those reported in Tables 1-4. The parameter estimates reported in Table 5 show that
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increases in general government spending tend to occur in tandem with decentralisation, in that they
are associated with a higher subnational spending share, especially after the crisis. This finding is
consistent with the prominent role played by the subnational governments in the execution of stimulus
programmes financed by the centre in the aftermath of the crisis. This effect is indeed particularly true
for economic affairs. By contrast, increases in general government spending seem to have taken place
at the central government level since the crisis in the areas of health care, education and social
protection, since spending hikes in these areas have been associated with lower subnational spending
shares. This is also the case of the effect of increases in general government indebtedness on
subnational spending shares, at least as far as outlays on social protection are concerned.13

Table 5. Baseline Regressions: Functional Composition of Spending
Specifications
Dependent Variables

Inflation rate

Real GDP growth

Real GDP per capita

Total Expenditures

Public Debt

Trade openness

Unemployment rate

Age dependency ratio

Stability

13

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Subnational
total spending
share

Subnational
share of
economic affairs
spending

Subnational
share of
spending on
health care

Subnational
share of
spending on
education

Subnational
share of spending
on social
protection

-22.571***

-80.499***

-106.018**

-14.191

-8.930

(5.298)

(23.172)

(41.295)

(19.205)

(26.794)

-3.662

19.229

0.466

18.790

30.261*

(3.810)

(20.082)

(18.498)

(17.697)

(16.192)

6.207***

-23.494***

28.537***

22.211**

-21.113*

(1.996)

(7.892)

(8.622)

(9.638)

(13.041)

15.827***

26.940*

66.512***

40.639**

61.914***

(3.900)

(15.292)

(23.224)

(17.314)

(21.268)

0.439

-1.127

-17.948*

3.771

8.104*

(0.884)

(4.026)

(9.406)

(4.127)

(4.762)

-0.001

-0.037

0.051

0.039

-0.006

(0.004)

(0.032)

(0.048)

(0.038)

(0.033)

0.104*

-0.993***

-0.025

0.367

-0.922***

(0.065)

(0.238)

(0.328)

(0.262)

(0.283)

0.066*

-0.443**

0.516**

0.292*

-0.677

(0.036)

(0.185)

(0.238)

(0.170)

(0.438)

0.002***

-0.077

-2.976

-3.965**

3.945

(0.001)

(1.716)

(2.328)

(2.013)

(2.938)

In some specifications the number of observations drops considerably due to data availability constraints,
hence our discussion of the results should be taken with care.
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Inflation rate*postgfc

Real GDP growth*postgfc

Real GDP per capita*postgfc

Total Expenditures*postgfc

Public Debt*postgfc

Constant

Observations
R-squared
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26.064***

60.114**

106.449**

4.930

23.688

(5.911)

(23.193)

(44.449)

(15.760)

(25.239)

5.725

-7.049

-36.633

-32.815

-31.745

(4.580)

(22.543)

(23.675)

(23.784)

(27.908)

-0.007

0.977

1.074

-0.662

-0.549

(0.166)

(0.612)

(0.737)

(0.483)

(0.533)

3.506*

18.751**

-23.805**

-30.264***

-23.681**

(2.069)

(9.308)

(11.862)

(8.117)

(11.624)

-0.476

-4.533

-1.347

-2.979

-7.896**

(0.517)

(3.282)

(4.328)

(2.560)

(3.891)

114.650***

-175.450**

323.666***

198.959**

-106.148

(18.533)

(72.574)

(81.464)

(87.189)

(114.677)

926

374

374

374

360

0.979

0.935

0.941

0.975

0.844

Note: Estimation of Equation (1) by OLS. Time and country fixed effects included but omitted for reasons of
parsimony. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Source: Authors’ estimations.

As for revenue, the results reported in Table 6 show that higher general government spending is
associated with a higher share of subnational tax revenue, a feature of the public finances that has
not changed since the crisis. However, in the case of social security revenue the effect of higher
general government spending on subnational revenue collection seems to have weakened since the
crisis. This phenomenon can be associated with protracted joblessness in the aftermath of the crisis,
which takes its toll on revenue, and/or efforts to alleviate the tax burden on labour income as a
means of encourage hires.14

14

For a recent paper on the topic of jobless recoveries see the work by Plotnikov (2014) who develops and
estimates a general equilibrium rational expectations model with search and multiple equilibria where aggregate
shocks have a permanent effect on the unemployment rate.
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Sensitivity analysis: Are advanced economies different?
Although the baseline regressions include both country and time fixed effects, it is possible that the
effects of the crisis on intergovernmental fiscal relations and the institutional arrangements that
govern decentralised policymaking differ in a more substantive manner between the advanced
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economies, on the one hand, and the emerging-market economies and developing countries, on the
other, than captured statistically by the inclusion of country fixed effects. To be sure, we re-estimated
the baseline regressions for two sub-samples on the basis of the income group definitions of advanced
and emerging-market and developing economies used by the World Bank. For reasons of parsimony
we limited ourselves to two sets of indicators (out of the three considered above), namely fiscal
Decentralisation and subnational autonomy.
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The regressions are estimated by OLS and include both country and time fixed effects for ease of
comparison with the baseline results. The parameter estimates reported in Table 7 are consistent with
the baseline findings, especially for the sub-sample of advanced economies, where general
government spending continues to be strongly positively associated with the fiscal decentralisation
indicators and strongly negatively associated with the overall subnational autonomy composite
indicator over the post-crisis period.

Among the controls, macroeconomic imbalances (proxied by inflation and unemployment) have a
strong negative effect on the decentralisation indicators in the sub-sample of advanced economies, as
in the baseline regressions, but not in the emerging-market and developing economies. By contrast,
the age dependency ratio has a strong negative effect on all the decentralisation indicators in the subsample of emerging-market and developing economies, as in the baseline regressions, but it has no
effect in the sub-sample of advanced economies. Trade openness and economic development
continue to be negatively associated with decentralisation, although the effects are stronger in the
sub-sample of advanced economies in the case of trade openness and in the sub-sample of emergingmarket economies and developing countries in the case of economic development.

4. Discussion and conclusions

The crisis that hit the global economy ten years ago has left profound social and economic scars,
especially in the advanced economies. The recovery has been slow from a historical perspective and,
in some cases, (real) output has barely recovered from pre-crisis levels. Public indebtedness also rose
sharply in several countries, both at the central and subnational government levels, to a large extent
as a result of the cyclical downturn and the ensuing counter-cyclical responses, as well as in some cases
the inclusion of extra-budgetary operations in stimulus packages. Medium-term budgetary
consolidation continues to be needed in those countries that were most severely affected by the crisis
to bring government debt to levels that would allow policymakers sufficient fiscal space to respond to
future downturns and face the secular challenges associated with population ageing.

Against this background, this paper sought to empirically assess the effects that the global financial
and economic crisis has had on intergovernmental fiscal relations. Several indicators were used to
gauge the effects of the crisis, including a range of budgetary aggregates as well as metrics of
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subnational policy and fiscal-financial managerial authority and their ability to influence national
policymaking and fiscal-financial management. These indicators allow for a finer distinction between
the effects of the crisis on the public finances, on the one hand, and on the institutional underpinnings
of policymaking and fiscal-financial management in decentralised settings, on the other. The indicators
selected for the empirical analysis have been used extensively in the literature, which facilitates
comparison.

Intergovernmental relations have been affected by the crisis in different ways, depending on the
specific fiscal, financial and institutional characteristics of the public finances in different countries.
The complexity of these arrangements in individual countries makes the task of identifying common
trends on the basis of comprehensive, albeit imperfect, indicators particularly arduous. In this respect,
it is important, as argued by Eccleston and Krever (2017), among others, to complement the crosscountry empirical analysis with case studies that can add nuance to the empirical findings on the basis
of country-specific considerations and context.

Bearing these caveats in mind, a key finding of the empirical analysis is that the crisis has had an
immediate effect on the public finances that reflects the role of the subnational governments in the
execution of counter-cyclical activism. On the basis of the budgetary aggregates used in the analysis
the post-crisis period can be characterised as decentralising in that the subnational shares of spending
and revenue rose in tandem with the increase in general government spending and indebtedness.

As for the policy and managerial authority indicators, a more nuanced conclusion emerges from the
empirical analysis. The parameter estimates show that increases in general government spending since
the crisis have been associated with a reduction in subnational authority across several aspects of
policymaking and managerial self-rule. The results are less clear-cut for the shared-rule indicators, but
it seems that the ability of subnational governments to influence national policymaking and fiscalfinancial management may have been curtailed too. By contrast, increases in general government
indebtedness since the crisis have been associated not only with greater subnational self-rule,
especially as far as their policy, taxing and borrowing autonomy is concerned, but also with greater
subnational influence in national law-making.
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Several hypotheses may be considered to explain why rising indebtedness at the level of the general
government may have resulted in greater subnational authority since the crisis. First, efforts have been
put in place in many countries to strengthen intergovernmental policy coordination, especially given
the need to muster political support for debt reduction through medium-term fiscal consolidation, as
well as securing agreement on specific policy packages that reflect the needs and preference of (often
diverse) jurisdictions.

Second, depending on the political and institutional settings in different countries, the sharing of the
costs of fiscal adjustment between the central and the subnational governments, as well as among the
various subnational jurisdictions, calls for bargaining over policy alternatives that may enhance the
influence of the subnational governments over national policy and their ability to “extract” concessions
from the central governments in matters of policy and fiscal-financial management. Indeed, TerMinassian and de Mello (2016) present different arrangements in the world’s largest federations and
note the emergence of intergovernmental policy fora to deal with debt, intergovernmental grants and
transfers, as well as spending and tax matters. These institutions have become in many cases the
primary fora for negotiating solutions to policy challenges, such as debt reduction, where the presence
of inter-jurisdictional spillovers require coordinated responses among the different layers of
government.
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APPENDIX

Number of countries in each decentralisation dataset

-Sow and Razafimahefa (2017)
US, UK, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Brazil, Chile,
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Cyprus, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Bhutan, India, Korea, Maldives, Pakistan,
Singapore, Lesotho, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tunisia, Belarus, Georgia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovak
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania, Croatia, Slovenia, Poland, Romania

-Dziobek et al. (2011)
US, UK, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, San Marino, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Malta, Portugal, Australia,
New Zealand, South Africa, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, Jamaica,
Cyprus, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Bhutan, Macao, Maldives, Singapore, Thailand, Congo, Lesotho, Mauritius,
Morocco, Seychelles, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, China, Ukraine, Czech Republic,
Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Poland, Romania

-Hooghe et al. (2016)
US, UK, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Turkey,
Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Belize, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobadg,
Cyprus, Israel, Brunei, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Albania, Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia,
Bostina, Poland, Romania
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Table A1. Summary statistics of main decentralisation indicators

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

Subnational share of spending

1086

0.295462

0.2130837

0

0.9844444

Subnational share of revenue

1129

0.2736883

0.1980593

0

0.7359749

Subnational share of transfers

1157

0.2720405

0.2001553

0

0.7602336

RAI

1540

9.230787

9.694887

0

36.98985

Self rule

1540

7.417439

7.173634

0

26.33583

Shared rule

1540

1.813348

3.306538

0

15.00702

Subnational total spending share

1022

87.20489

13.46005

15.2067

103.7478

Subnational share of economic affairs spending

420

76.92277

23.50839

17.51112

117.5599

Subnational share of spending on health care

421

73.49565

36.13101

1.442035

156.0339

Subnational share of spending on education

420

64.94665

35.57261

3.615229

103.5205

Subnational share of spending on social
protection

406

90.25978

19.03503

2.860025

189.9373

Subnational total revenue share

1048

86.80203

13.77414

15.19276

103.0247

Subnational share of tax revenue

1084

85.33459

15.92151

0.4744988

100

971

98.53022

3.689191

78.57059

127.2789

Subnational share of social security revenue
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Table A2. Correlation Matrix of main Decentralisation indicators

Variable

Subnational share of spending

Subnational Subnational Subnational
share of
share of
share of
RAI
spending
revenue
transfers

Subnational
Subnational
share of
total
Shared rule
economic
spending
affairs
share
spending

Self rule

Subnational
share of
spending on
health care

Subnational
Subnational
share of
share of
spending on
spending on
social
education
protection

Subnational
Subnational
Subnational share of
total
share of tax social
revenue
revenue
security
share
revenue

1

Subnational share of revenue

0.7889

Subnational share of transfers

0.7364

0.963

1

0.465

0.5743

0.4339

1

Self rule

0.4285

0.5398

0.4064

0.9671

1

Shared rule

0.4373

0.5173

0.3913

0.8339

0.666

1

Subnational total spending share

-0.6517

-0.6413

-0.5501

-0.5948

-0.556

-0.5321

1

Subnational share of economic affairs spending

-0.8713

-0.7804

-0.6335

-0.8876

-0.8306

-0.8769

0.7911

Subnational share of spending on health care

-0.8219

-0.7794

-0.7825

-0.827

-0.7752

-0.8145

0.7025

0.6745

1

Subnational share of spending on education

-0.8938

-0.8622

-0.8169

-0.8061

-0.7607

-0.785

0.8019

0.7586

0.8122

1

Subnational share of spending on social
protection

-0.5468

-0.3219

-0.2719

-0.2224

-0.2806

-0.0906

0.5453

0.5026

0.5262

0.4285

1

Subnational total revenue share

-0.651

-0.6451

-0.5584

-0.6105

-0.569

-0.5504

0.9901

0.8138

0.7245

0.8111

0.6248

1

Subnational share of tax revenue

-0.6325

-0.6556

-0.6156

-0.5982

-0.5718

-0.5171

0.9498

0.7248

0.7021

0.7921

0.4894

0.956

1

Subnational share of social security revenue

-0.2062

-0.2116

-0.1807

-0.3604

-0.3373

-0.3301

0.4427

0.0742

-0.0742

-0.0448

0.0715

0.4379

0.3416

RAI

1

1

32

International Center for Public Policy

